In this post I develop an undermining of the Dispositional Essentialism view that there are properties inherent within concrete objects that have dispositional essences that can be suddenly combined with the Aristotelian thesis of hylomorphism that all concrete objects are compositions of matter and form through the weakening of matter being a strong individuator, rendering matter having a dispositional failure, thus resulting in the incompatibility with both positions. Showing this failure also gives rise to why matter cannot be a principle of individuation.

Notes:

First, I use footnotes in this post—they can be found at the end of this post.

Second, If you’re going to use this post in any sort of way of distribution, make sure to cite it. All fair use rules apply.

🙂.

Introduction

The dispositional essentialist says that there are properties inherent within concrete objects that have some sort of dispositional essence. A hylomorphist who adopts this sort of view would form a position that asserts matter as a dispositional property and also gives rise and causes other dispositional properties to exist. But there is something wrong here. What is the explanation of a dispositional property causing another something else to exist, in which it too is a dispositional property? In short, how can one dispositional property cause another dispositional property to exist? Another problem is that, with all of our dispositional properties, they exist embedded within property-bearing existents. For matter, though, it seems to be it is not embedded within a property-bearing existent, and exists independently of any sort of metaphysical complexity.

Even more, if matter truly is a dispositional property, how would it be the case that it disposes itself in order to create the qualitative features (i.e., color, shape, etc.,)? It seems as though substantial form is what is ‘disposed’ or ‘used’ in order to get these qualitative features. Alternatively, it seems redundant for the hylomorphist to adopt a dispositional essentialist view in accommodation of matter; it seems incoherent for matter to have any sort of dispositional essence, in virtue of the weak causal power it holds for its apparent act of individuation in concrete objects, and thus substantial form is what has the dispositional essence, therefore disambiguating the hylomorphist’s account of what individuates what.

There is a problem for dispositional essentialism as well. The physical mechanisms that seem to have dispositional properties are susceptible to the physical constraints purported upon by nature, and thus are strongly held to be ‘weak’ and not being able to do their ‘job’ in terms of their dispositional features. This then breaks down the framework for the dispositional essentialist such that they hold a view of dispositional properties having their manifestations necessarily.

What is Dispositional Essentialism?

Dispositional Essentialism is the view that asserts that there are at least some properties that are inherent within property-bearing existents[1] that have something called a dispositional essence. This dispositional essence is what is referred to as the essence of properties that have powers. Powers in properties are essentially what the property can do in nature; what it disposes in nature. For example, the properties that may be identified within say, an electrical circuit. The properties of an electrical circuit can be said to compute only one pure function f, whether it be an identity function or an addition function (quidentity or quaddition) (Ramos-Díaz, 2021). Basically, if the conductor of the electrical circuit actualizes the electrical circuit, then the electrical circuit’s input I would then compute the pure function O. The dispositional essence of this electrical circuit though, is characterized within the power of ‘electrical transmission’: the power to distribute a large amount of electrical power in order to compute a pure function. The dispositional essence of these properties inherent within the property-bearing existents, then, is simply what the properties of the property-bearing existents necessarily do. I say necessarily because, it could not be the case that, for example, the dispositional property ‘solubility’ be the explanandum property for another event other than the event of dissolving when placed in water.

Dispositional essentialists also hold that the dispositional properties of property-bearing existents are the fundamental cause for all of the changes within the natural world. This means that, in virtue of the mere existence of dispositional properties, change occurs, and is also explainable in virtue of the mere existence of dispositional properties. This claim also comes with mild modal implications, i.e., it is necessary that dispositional properties exist if and only if change occurs in the natural world. That is to say dispositional properties existentially depend upon the occurrence of change. And so forth, dispositional properties are what explain change. But there is a better way to explain the existential dependency relation between dispositional properties in the modal sense: if it is necessary that change occurs (in the sense that, there cannot, and never will be, a possible world where at least one instance of change does not occur), then it is necessary that dispositional properties exist. With this alternative way to show the modal implications held amongst the existential dependency relation between change and dispositional properties, it bears the strength in power of what the role of dispositional properties are.[2]

Change Through Dispositionality

A very important question to ask now: what does this model of change look like? One way to answer this question is through processism, that everything is process-oriented. Though this is not our main focus, it is still important to inform the reader on the implications of dispositional essentialism.

‘Change’ through dispositions happens under the actualization of that disposition due to the fact that the property-bearing existents has been met with its stimulus conditions, that which those stimulus conditions actualize these dispositional properties into what they are meant to do. If we look at almost all of our instances of change, we can see that yes, they are dispositional instances. For example, a living organism dying: this is an instance of the stimulus conditions, (being the annihiliation or deconstruction of biological processes within the living organism), being met by the living organism in order to actualize this disposition. It was always potential, it just needed to be actualized. And so, therefore, this is a dispositional instance because it is an actualization of a [universal] dispositional feature. ‘Death’ is a universal feature, first dispositional, then categorical. What I mean by ‘first dispositional, then categorical’, is mainly what happens after the dispositional property has been actualized. The dispositional property ‘dying’ had been actualized due to some stimulus condition out in the world. After this dispositional property has been actualized, it then progresses the living organism into its categorical state — what it looks like when it is dead; the fact or state of the living organism. This is essentially change under the dispositional essentialist framework, which can be very much so characterized within an Aristotelian view, due to the heavy usage of ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’.

Oderberg, Matter and Substantial Form

What is also very important to speak about is David S. Oderberg’s real essentialism. In spite of individuation and problems of individuation, Oderberg’s position (real essentialism) holds that: “Individuation depends on the kind of thing we are concerned with.” This means that, for example, the process of water being boiled is individuated from the heat of the stove. Essentially, the object of the outcome of the event is necessarily individuated from the source of what made it occur. This “neo-Aristotelian” thesis of essentialism simply shows that it is not compatible with dispositional essentialism, such that dispositional essentialism holds it outcomes necessarily with the dispositional property in question. This is at least one reason to hold the incompatibility between dispositional essentialism and neo-Aristotelian essentialism(s).

To explain the heat of the boiling water, the hot stove is necessary and essential to explain the heat of the boiling water. To explain the water vapor or the bubbles in the boiling water, the process of condensation is vital to explain this physical change in a liquid. To say that the dispositions that have been actualized from these events and are then individuated from these events removes the possibility of explaining the essence of what has become of this event. By virtue of this, it would seem manageable to look at this process of individuation as redundant. This analysis of individuation is also minimally seen within hylomorphism. Hylomorphism is an Aristotelian doctrine that asserts all things have form and are individuated by matter. The ‘form’ of something in the hylomorphist perspective, is essentially the very essence of a thing.

The hylomorphist reaches matter as the principle of diversity, the principle that diversifies material substances. In this sense, substance is the consequential phenomenon of unity. That is to say that all substances are unified, and not multiple. This would mean that there is nothing diverse about substances in this sense, because matter is not yet acknowledged as a diversifier of substances.

To hold that substance is a phenomenon of unity because form is endowed upon all substances seems not all that coherent to me. The substantial form of a material substance would be the various characteristic properties and various powers that would be within the nature of this material substance. So, it must be the case that substantial form is something that varies amongst one another. What oderberg is trying to get at here is that because all material substances have substantial forms, then substantial form is the unification amongst all material substances.

The hylomorphist, of course, would think of this to be coherent, but the very usage of ‘unification’ in this sense is by no means coherent. Incidentally, substantial form itself would be the principle of diversity, and what diversifies the material substances. Substantial form when used in the case as endowing amongst material substances, like we said before, gives the characteristic properties and the various powers to material substances. powers like causal powers, and characteristic properties like shape, color, mass, etc. substantial form, in this sense, is then what seems to individuate the material substances, such that all material substances when endowed with substantial form are all given various powers and different characteristic properties. What I think Oderberg is trying to get at by saying that substantial form (or really just form) is that principle of unity, is that because all substances have form, then there is some sort of unification amongst these material substances. Of course, this is true. Though, I could say the same thing about how all material substances have a property of density. I could then go on to say that density is the principle of unity amongst all material substances just because they have it. Though, there is another consideration when looking at the principle of unity: form is what unites the material components within a material substance. But we should not get into this.[3] The thing is, when substantial form is really in action it acts as an individuator amongst all material substances, but when form is looked at retrospectively, it is existent within all material substances. The problem here is that the hylomorphist thinks that matter is what diversifies that material substance.

When we come at the conclusion that matter is what diversifies the material substance, but then substantial form is also what individuates and diversifies the material substance, we seem to have come at several commonalities between form and matter. The main thing here is that form and matter have different powers under the hylomorphist view. But if we were to take this to a position of neutrality it would then again seem like substantial form and matter have the same powers or job. Or, we could take a different stance and say that matter has a passive power while substantial form has an active power: i.e. matter has the power, capacity, potentiality, or ability to undergo change, and substantial form has the power, capacity, potentiality, or ability to change.

Matter as a Weak Individuator

There are other approaches to go to in order to identify matter as a weak individuator or that it is not an individuator at all. One of these approaches is embedded within the fact that matter cannot be the principle of diversity or individuation, because matter is multiply instantiable. What I mean by this is that because matter has multiple instances of itself throughout material substances, it itself cannot be the principle of diversity. Why this is so is because if there are multiple instances of matter, then matter is merely just a trait of material substances, a feature. The hylomorphist takes it so that matter is communicable amongst material substances individuating them, but in this sense if matter was the distinguishing trait amongst material substances, then it would be the case that matter is incommunicable. It is important not to take this the wrong way, though. If we take some sort of naturalistic stance and abandon the hylomorphist view that a principle of diversity or a principle of individuation has to have some sort of power to individuate amongst material substances, then we can still approach the fact that matter is still the principle of diversity. What I meant by ‘naturalistic’ view was that matter itself does not need any sort of causal power or be the top of some sort of existential relation or causal relation with another material substance in order to individuate it from other material substances. From this naturalistic view, matter is something that is just ‘there’ within material substances. The view that I had developed with substantial form being the principle of diversity is also the same with this view taken against the hylomorphist.

Oderberg also explains some sort of problem of circularity in the hylomorphist view. This view is that because matter possess such-and-such determinate quantity inherent within material substances like shape, size, volume, location. Oderberg continues on:

This is because determinate quantity is accidental, but accidents presuppose the existence (and hence individuation) of the individual substance in which they inhere, so the individuation of substance by accident would be circular.[4]

To be a healthy skeptic about what Oderberg says, one would have to question the supposed individuation that accidents somehow give to material substance. As we know, the determinate quantity that is held within a material substance is the size, shape, location, and volume that it holds. In what shape or form would these characteristic properties be accidental to the material substance? These characteristic properties of the material substance are that of essential properties in the sense that they are intrinsic in a way that gives them their substantial form. But of course, there are still some accidents in material substances. But in the Aristotelian view and really more the hylomorphist view, determinate quantity is accidental. We can attend back to the naturalistic view that was developed earlier on. This naturalistic view would adhere to the fact that the so-called ‘accidental attributes’ identified by the hylomoprhist, are not actually accidental, and are necessary essential properties for the material substance. This tenet of the naturalistic view is cogent in the sense that one would not be able to identify the primitivity within a material substance without its essential properties; determinate quantity.

Matter’s Dispositional Failure

If we attend to the Identity Theory of Powers, we will see that all fundamental properties that are a part of the primitive ontology of a material substance are in fact dispositional powerful qualities. We can see in the hylomorphist view that matter is in fact endowed with some sort of dispositionality, and accommodates the property of determinate quantity to material substances. Of course, matter is disposed to the determinate quantity of material substances, but if it were still held that matter was a principle of diversity or a principle of individuation, a vital problem would follow. Oderberg begins:

Thirdly, the principle of individuation cannot be matter as disposed for the possession of such-and-such determinate quantity. Now, although such a disposition may not be accidental but essential to a thing’s nature, it will not do. (1) Few if any substances have matter disposed to a determinate quantity (though many micro-particles do, and perhaps some micro-organisms), only to a range of quantities. (2) A disposition to quantity follows from the possession by matter of substantial form: it is because Socrates is human that he is disposed (speaking now of ranges) to a height greater than six inches; Socrates would not be so disposed if he were an ant. Hence, as will be explained, even if matter with a disposition to quantity were the principle of individuation, form would have to play a role in individuation by giving otherwise indifferent prime matter whatever it is that enables matter to individuate.[5]

The problem is now evident. Matter as a dispositional property to a material substance and the principle of diversity or principle of individuation gives rise to the necessity of having substantial form interfere. The role of matter — dispositionally — is only to contribute to the determinate quantity of the material substance, where substantial form would do the other necessary parts. This case is not necessarily as a means of falsifying matter being a principle of diversity or individuation. It may be that there is still hope for thinking matter is still the principle of diversity or individuation. We can take it as that matter is the necessary condition for the substantial form to take place. With this, it would be that without matter, there would be no form of a material substance. We can advance this radically and take account that without matter, there would be no individuation amongst material substances. But does this instance still make it so that matter is the principle of diversity? The principle of diversity, be it something that needs a necessary condition, does not make it so that the necessary condition is the principle of diversity or individuation. The thing that is doing the individuating is the substantial form a material substance. We could also make it a case that if there are material substances, then there would have to be something that individuates them necessarily, and this thing that individuates them necessarily would be the substantial form. Since there is no case to be made that matter is the principle of diversity by being the necessary condition of substantial form, it would be maintained that substantial form is still the principle of diversity or individuation. It seems that, even with this, that again there is no hope for the hylomorphist, and if one, one would have to reconcile his own view.

Reconciliation for the Hylomorphist

So how should the hylomorphist reconcile his own view? One should start off by simply rearranging the framework of first and foremost, the individuation of material substances, and thus reconstructing the framework of essences in material substances. How would one go about doing so? The easiest way is to ascribe strong qualitative properties to the principle of individuation one yield for, whether its substantial form or matter.

To reconstruct the essence of material substances is firmly grounded within the principle of individuation. The essence of a material substance are the essential properties of a material substance; so, the determinate quantity of a material substance. The determinate quantities of a material substance, again, are precisely the size, shape, volume, and even the color of a material substance. It is then drawn out that whatever the principle of individuation is, it must account for the determinate quantities of the material substances it is individuating, for if it were not to account for the determinate quantities of the material substances, then it would remain that there are strong commonalities amongst material substances, when obviously, there are not.

This being said, one may take it that substantial form would be the principle of diversity or individuation. Others would come to the conclusion that substantial form is just an important factor in the individuating of material substances. From substantial form being an important factor in the individuating of a material substance it is then held that substantial form — not being the principle of diversity of individuation — is rather the factor that gives specific information to the material substance.

If we go back to matter looked at being a dispositional property, we can see that matter just disposes itself for the material substance, but then substantial form comes into play and then gives the specific information needed to the material substance that is being individuated. So, perhaps we can touch on the necessary condition point again. We can formalize it as (i) in order for a material substance to be individuated, it needs substantial form to give specific information to it, and (ii) but without matter, substantial form cannot give this specific information to the material substance, because without matter there would be nothing to give specific information to. It would then be concluded that for the process of individuation to occur, there must be a disposition of matter to a material substance. What then could be formulated is that substantial form could never be a principle of diversity of individuation, because it can be strictly defined as a categorical property. The reasoning behind why one would think that substantial form could be merely described as a categorical property is grounded within the dispositionality of matter.

A categorical property is simply a quality of a material substance, in this case. Saying that substantial form is a categorical property is to say that of all of its properties are ones that do not include individuating powers. In this view, one would say that the substantial form of a material substance would arise another way, a way of emergence. This means that the matter that is disposed to the material substance somehow makes substantial form emerge into the material substance. Under this view, then, matter has some sort of power that can ascribe categorical properties unto a material substance, and substantial form is one of these categorical properties. One may as well think that substantial form is a categorical property amongst all material substances, but if one were to hold the view that substantial form is nothing more but a categorical property amongst all material substances, and that it emerges from the dispositional power of matter, it would be respectively difficult to explain the nature of matter’s dispositional properties. One may say that matter, along with its dispositional properties, has some sort of qualitative properties with it. These qualitative properties would radically make it so that substantial form does not have to exist. The qualitative powers in matter would allow matter to be able to give the determinate quantities for a material substance, where substantial form is in act the determinate quantities given to a material substance. To expound more on this, the determinate quantities such as size, shape, etc., all are existent within the concept of substantial form. These qualities are known as the aspects of substantial form and all play in part for the existence of the substantial form of a material substance.

The substantial form x of material substance f is a physical system existent to formally determine the physical qualities and physical processes of f, and formally computes the determinate quantities of f. that is to say that matter dispositionally computes substantial form x to the essence of material substance f and substantial form x subsequently becomes the essence of f. From this, would it be that essence is given to the existence of a material substance dispositionally? Perhaps yes, for if a material substance is existing without any determinate quantity and there are other material substances existent without their own determinate quantities, the said material substances are taken to be existing in unison.

Structural Powers

The unity of the living organism is determined, in the neo-Aristotelian sense, by a power that has some sort of teleological nature. This power must be capable of formally causing the purpose of the living organism, as Oderberg says:

Yet the goal is there, however we got it and however any organism of any kind got it. Using more traditional terminology, I claim that organisms display immanent causation: causation that originates with an agent and terminates in that agent for the sake of its self-perfection. By ‘self-perfection’ I do not mean that there is some ideal type that every organism strives to reach. The idea is far more modest—namely that every organism aims, whether consciously or not, at the fulfilment of its potentialities such that it achieves a good state of being, indeed the best state it can reach given the limitations of its kind and its environment.[6]

This immanent causation is a teleological sort of causation that is somewhat indistinguishable from formal causation. Formal causation is defined as the purpose of the living organism in question, in this case it would then be the self-perfection or the stored potentialities that grant the self-perfection to the living organism. It would also indirectly follow that what strives for self-perfection, uses its own sort of ‘abilities’ it had been given, determined by the environment it was created in, to accomplish the goal of self-perfection consciously or unconsciously. But how can the idea of every living organism wanting to aim for self-perfection help us with what structural powers are? Simple: the process of self-perfection represents the adaptation of having to reorganize its morphological features so it can sustain itself for the gaining of self-perfection. Christopher J. Austin and Anna Marmodoro explain their account of neo-Aristotelian structural powers as is:

The unique teleological nature of these powers, we argue, enables them to function as the proper metaphysical ground of the unity of organisms. According to our account, that unity is displayed not in the capacity of an organism to sustain the diachronic stasis of its morphological features (and their constituents), but in the persistence of its specified capacity for the dynamically adaptive reorganisation of those features.[7]

With this, then, structural powers can be defined as the powers that help the living organism to dynamically adapt to the reorganization of its own morphological features and their constituents.

The conditions that determine a mereological complexities could very well be overwhelming. If this is the case, then a biological organism that entertains any sort of metaphysical status associated with mereological complexities may become even more difficult to determine whether they really are associated with that metaphysical status and if they really can be. Some simple compositions have their morphological features consisted within some sort of intricate hierarchy that explicates the causal and functional dependence that the simple composition wholly depends on. These necessary features for the function of the simple composition are the ‘multitude’ of anatomical levels of organization. These anatomical levels are described as necessary features such that the simple composition wholly depends on the organisation of these causal-cum­-functional morphological features.

Diachronic unity in biological entities is what some think is merely incapable of happening. Rather, synchronic unity is what is more plausible. The reason is because biological entities’ morphological features cannot persist over time since biological entities have material and thus spatial changes over time scales. So, it is more logical to hold that the morphological features and their metaphysical complexities are temporally transient, and hold trans-temporal accounts. Even more, it could be said that the type of unity that is upheld by biological entities is a synchronic unity forever, and the morphological features and their metaphysical complexities are transtemporal.

The relations among the constituents in the metaphysical complexity of the morphological features of the biological entity is something that is an attribution to the synchronic identity of the biological entity. But why can’t we hold diachronic identity? Although the mereological identity of biological entities may never be consistent within time-scales, the morphological features and their metaphysical complexities of biological entities are sure to never change, just reorganised.[1] If we take a look at the definition of diachronic identity, we can see that it is not a reorganisation of morphological features in biological entities, rather it is the annihilation of previous morphological features and the introduction of new morphological features. And even more, these new morphological features are that of isomorphic features. Making it so it is just a reintroduction of the same but different morphological features. So instead of holding transtemporal morphological features, we can hold to diachronic identity and introduce isomorphic features.

With this in stock, how can it help the hylomoprhist? Well, from earlier examinations of the problems of matter’s primacy of being the principle of individuation, it can be said now that matter distributes what is necessary in order for material substances (biological entities) to be formally identified viz., their structural powers provided by matter. It is then necessary to note that this process of matter taking place in the individuation of material substances can be put to use with the causal-cum-functional morphological features of the material substance. Matter then, is the necessary condition for the individuation of material substances to take place, and is thus the indirect necessary condition for the biological entities that had been individuated gain their own dispositional essential properties, such as their structural powers.

The structural powers of the living organism are able to grant the individuation of these living organisms through the representation of the morphological features of these living organisms. Structural powers, then, are some sort of formal mode of explanation, giving the living organism’s explanation of their formal components. This theme of form as a structural power is also seen in Kathrin Koslicki’s neo-Aristotelian thesis of hylomorphism:

for now, however, we may think of the formal components associated with a particular kind of whole, following Verity Harte’s model as discussed in Chapter V, as the sorts of entities which provide ‘‘slots’’ to be filled by objects of a certain kind: thus, the formal components belonging to a particular kind of whole will generally specify not only the configuration to be exhibited by the material components in question, i.e., how these objects are to be arranged with respect to one another; they will also usually specify the variety of material components of which the whole in question may be composed, i.e., what sorts of objects can go into the various ‘‘slots’’ provided by the formal components.

In this neo-Aristotelian thesis, then, structural powers are the necessary and foundational conditions for the formal components that are grounded in the material components of a material object. Structural powers in this case are also then the persistence conditions for the material objects, such that they are the necessary conditions for the replacing of morphological features in living organisms: without them the models of living organisms’ persistence throughout would collapse into absurdity.

Downfall of Dispositional Essentialism

In the recent work of Antonio Ramos Diaz in ‘Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature’, he presents a chapter focused upon the logical and mathematical powers of physical mechanisms within the natural, physical world. This chapter showed the incapability and formal indeterminacy of physical mechanisms due to their “finitary processing power”[8]. This means for the dispositional essentialist that the property-bearing existents in the natural world—that which are physical denizens—may have some sort of finitary processing power in terms of their dispositional properties. But what does it mean to have finitary processing power? Perhaps it should be defined as the “incapability to compute an infinitary (or infinite) number of outputs”. Though this may be true for some sort of physical mechanism or physical existent, how can it be applied to the property-bearing existents? In order of an application of finitary processing power to property-bearing existents, it may be necessary to then define finitary processing power as not being able to do the best job. In this case, then, the term ‘finitary’ is synonymous with ‘blunder’ or a ‘gaffe’. It could then be said that the dispositional properties of the physical property-bearing existents do bad at their jobs. But why would someone say this? One answer: physical constraints. Physical constraints are simply the necessities of nature that are purported upon physical mechanisms. Ramos-Díaz says:

Another necessity of nature is that physical mechanisms decay, break down, malfunction, and cease to exist. Breakdowns and malfunctions seem to be normative: they indicate at least that the mechanism is failing to follow some norm or rule that it is supposed to be following.[9]

 These constraints can vary in the likes of decay, malfunction, or any other type of external impediment. When these physical constraints are necessarily purported unto property-bearing existents, then we arrive at an assault on the dispositional properties of these property-bearing existents. The statements we make about these property-bearing existents include some of these external impediments. From this, it can be stated that the quality of these property-bearing existents is hindered to their susceptibility of the physical constraints purported by the necessities of nature, and thus it must be said that these property-bearing existents cannot always have the conclusion that their dispositional properties do the fullest job. The dispositional properties too are in a way hindered. Because of the finitary processing capacity that every property-bearing existent is met with, the dispositional properties of these property-bearing existents are always susceptible to failure as well. If solubility is the dispositional property of a property-bearing existent, then it could always be that the intermolecular forces in terms of attraction between the solute and solvent change in some way, therefore hindering the solubility process in a way where the solute does not fully dissolve or something of the like. If the dispositional essentialist sticks to holding to the framework of dispositional properties having their necessary outcomes or necessary manifestations, then it seems as though with the reasoning above that the manifestations that occur from the dispositional properties may not have happened, thus making the dispositional essentialist’s view of both change and necessary connections between dispositional properties and their manifestations false.

Conclusion

The dispositional essentialist thinks that there are some properties within concrete objects that dispositional essences, meaning they have some sort of powers in nature. The hylomorphist adopts this view in a way where he thinks that it accommodates his own view through the acknowledgement of dispositional essences of properties. Though, I think this cannot hold since the explanatory power of what matter does in terms of individuation is unclear, and thus the apparent dispositional essence of matter should be abandoned. I considered the ‘downfall’ of dispositional essentialism through the physical constraints purported unto physical mechanisms by nature. These physical constraints make it so that the dispositional properties of property-bearing existents are susceptible to the necessities of nature; decay, malfunction, etc. it then makes it so that the property-bearing existents have ‘unreliable’ dispositional properties, and we thus have come at an end for the reliability and sustainability of the dispositional properties of property-bearing existents. The only way to reconcile for dispositional essentialism is the interpret some sort of ‘perfect’ property-bearing existent that is in no way shape or form susceptible to the necessary physical constraints of nature, one that does not exist within the bounds of the natural, physical world. Maybe, though, this property-bearing existent does not have to be perfect, just existent outside the natural and physical world — an abstract entity.

Notes and References

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[1] I use the term ‘property-bearing existent’ to define the regular, natural existent — the physical, paradigmatic substances — within the natural, physical world.

[2] What I mean by the ‘strength’ of dispositional properties is simply the explanatory power they hold when represented within the modal implications; in one way, they seem like they exist if and only if something else exists, on the other hand, they seem like they explain the existence of something, and do it in a way where it exists if and only if it exists.

[3] For further reading, Skrzypek, J. (2017). Three Concerns for Structural Hylomorphism. Analytic Philosophy, 58(4), 360–408.

[4] David Oderberg, Real essentialism, 109.

[5] Ibid., 110.

[6] David Oderberg, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Contemporary Science, 354.

[7] Koons, R., Simpson, W., & Teh, N. (2019). Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science.

[8] Antonio Ramos-Díaz, Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature, 224.

[9] Ibid., 225.